This case study involves Russia’s involvement in Ukraine during the revolution of 2010. This is the tactic that Russia used to interfere our elections. This is the 5th and final study.
Case Study V: Invasion of Ukraine, 2014
Before analyzing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it is first important to examine Russia’s evolving Conceptualization of deception, recent discussion by Russian military theorist, and Russia’s evolving understanding of military operations. Russian discussions regarding deception have focused on the rise of obman (deception), voennaya khitrost (military cunning), and vvedenie v zabluzhdenie (to mislead) as replacements for maskirovka (now trending back to its original meaning of concealment or camouflage only). Russian experts have debated the relevance of the term maskirovka. Theorists point out that maskirovka (as concealment) is a component of deception (obman) and not the other way around. The internal Russian debate argues that the term maskirovka is vague and illogically groups all deception under the Russian term for concealment. This has moved maskirovka back to its original meaning of concealment and the use of a more appropriate term to encompass all deception efforts under it. Essentially, the overarching principles and elements of maskirovka are retained, but under a more appropriate terminology. Like maskirovka, obman is an umbrella term for deception. In this section, obman supplants maskirovka in an effort to stay within the currently accepted Russian conception of deception.
Russia’s understanding of the nature of warfare, like its conceptualization of deception, has evolved with the passage of time. Commonly referred to as the Gerasimov Doctrine or New-Generation War, Chief of the Russian General Staff General Valery Gerasimov outlined his observations of modern warfare in Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (Military-Industrial Courier). General Gerasimov, along with other Russian military theorist, make several observations of note relevant to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Gerasimov observed that there is no longer a clear distinction between war and peace. Further, in modern war, increased emphasis is placed upon informational and psychological warfare. Correspondingly, this requires the use of non-military means of power, in conjunction with the military, but has the potential to reduce the required military power.
In new generation war, public institutions, mass media, religious organizations, cultural institutions, NGOs, public movements, criminal, and diplomats are all weapons of the aggressor state. These institutions all assist in the information and psychological war that weakens the target state. Obman assists in this effort, as these organizations use disinformation to assist in the concealment of military operations and the effort as a whole.
In line with Russia’s understanding of modern warfare and the continued importance of obman to Russian operational art, Russia has employed a host of deception measures in Ukraine to conceal Russian involvement, dissuade outside intervention, and control public opinion. Russian deception in Crimea centered on disinformation to conceal involvement of Russian soldiers in the seizure of the territory. On February 27, 2014, “little green men” who wore Russian military uniforms, without insignia, seized key infrastructure in Ukraine’s autonomous state of Crimea. Russians spread disinformation from multiple levels of the government, denying Russian involvement. President Vladimir Putin denied the involvement of Russian armed force. As an alternative, he claimed that the armed men in Crimea were civil defense forces and that Russian military uniforms were easily purchased almost anywhere7 Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, further perpetuated the deception. Lavrov claimed media suggestions of Russian involvement as “complete nonsense” and that Russian soldiers were still present in their military installations. It was not until after the Russian annexation of Crimea that President
Putin admitted that Russian soldiers participated in the seizure of Crimea. A deception that was useful, then replaced one that was not. Russian media followed Putin’s revelation with claims that the actions were necessary to protect Russia speakers from Ukrainian fascists. Demonstrations by Russian Federation Armed Forces along the Ukrainian border supported Russian actions in Crimea. The buildup of troop during the Crimean takeover diverted Ukrainian attention away from events in Crimea1 This buildup postured forces for the invasion of eastern Ukraine that followed shortly after the annexation of Crimea. In early May 2014, the Ukrainian cities of Donetsk and Luhansk declared independence from Ukraine. Like events in Crimea, the Russian government used deception to obfuscate involvement in transpiring events and create plausible deniability. Deception in Donetsk and Luhansk shared similarities with Crimea. Demonstrations as a form of obman misdirected both western media and intelligence. Russian state run media and social media dispersed widespread disinformation. Russian troops were committed to fighting, but their involvement denied. During the course of fighting in eastern Ukraine, the Russians used aid convoys as a means of directing attention away from incursions of Russian forces and military equipment into Ukraine. Observers and media heavily scrutinized these convoys as they crossed the border into Ukraine. Examination of these convoys revealed that they carried little in the way of aid and nothing in the way of military equipment. Instead, the real movement of Russian military hardware and personnel occurred at other crossing points, simultaneously with the aid convoys. The entire effort was a simple demonstration that used a shiny object to draw attention away from meaningful crossings.
The Russian government obfuscated events in eastern Ukraine through a disinformation campaign that used public statements from prominent political leaders, social media, and the Russian media. When confronted with reports that Russian soldiers had been fighting in eastern Ukraine, Russian government and politicians consistently denied involvement. Instead, the Russian government noted that many ethnic Russians had heeded the call to arms and gone to eastern Ukraine as patriotic volunteers, others were Russian citizens on holiday. Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, denied Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine as he did in Ukraine’s Crimea. These claims persisted despite the capture of Russian soldiers and the death of Russian military personnel in Ukraine.
Further disinformation in Ukraine involved widespread disinformation from Russian media and internet trolls that made a wide variety of negative and disparaging remarks about Ukraine’s execution of the war.116 In one deception, online social media falsified Ukrainian government documents to discredit the Ukrainian government’s support to the war effort. Accusations by social media claimed that the Ukrainian government sold US supplied weapons to Syria for personal gain. Russian state media bolstered the narrative and claimed the Ukrainian government had abandoned the front line Ukrainian military. Both of these are examples of the disinformation campaign used to discredit the Ukrainian government’s fight to regain sovereign territory.
The downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 highlights how state-owned Russian media sowed doubt for the government. Following the downing of the commercial airline, Russian news started a sustained disinformation campaign to create confusion and to control the narrative surrounding the event. In the days that followed, the Russian media perpetuated numerous theories regarding what had happened to Flight MH17. All of the theories presented were consistent with their message; the downing of the aircraft had no Russian or separatist involvement and that Ukraine and the United States destroyed MH17. The message presented by Russian media was for domestic Russia consumption and used to obfuscate events surrounding MH17’s destruction. Russian media would later claim that the BUK missile system in question had been Ukrainian hardware, captured by separatists as a way to explain its presence on the battlefield.
Disinformation and deception experienced diminishing returns as evidence of Russian involvement was uncovered. Social media, geotags, and news media made it more difficult to maintain a deception. Once Russia’s invasion was underway, these media vehicles assisted in providing evidence counter to Russia’s narrative of popular uprising in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. In this regard, social media proved an effective counter to Russia’s state run media.
Russian media consistently manipulated images used in supporting the Russian narrative of what was occurring in Crimea and Ukraine. Russian media fabricated events utilizing images from Chechnya, Syria, and Kosovo. Further exposed fabrications included Russian media using the same actor in multiple roles, scenes, and situations but adhering to a single narrative.
Social media and the internet allowed Russia to disseminate disinformation but also provided opportunities to disprove the deceptions. In a few instances, Russian soldiers uploaded photos of themselves in Ukraine.Poor operational security, lack of knowledge about metadata contained in pictures, and social media provided proof against Russian claims of no soldiers in Ukraine. Russian deception experienced further degradation with analysis of other disinformation attempts. An investigation proved the strangulation of a pregnant woman by a pro-Ukrainian extremist and the Odessan doctor was false. No remains could be located, medical personnel had no records of such a person or death, and people in the reported location could not confirm the event. Bloggers refuted the Doctor from Odessa claims when they revealed the doctor’s picture was from an online dental brochure. Following the revelation, the Facebook page was deleted, and no such doctor could be found.
In addition, captured Russian soldiers have also revealed Russia’s role in Ukraine. Mass media and the internet have been assets the Ukrainian government leveraged to dispel Russian deception efforts. The Ukrainian government posted video of captured Russian soldiers identifying themselves and explaining their activities in Ukraine on social media, as evidence against Russian disinformation. In one such posting, Russian soldier Private 1st Class Ivan V. Milchakov identified himself as an active member of the Russian military and was aware that he was fighting in Ukraine. Of particular interest to Private 1st Class Milchak ov’s admission was that he was unaware of the objective of his incursion into Ukraine.
Invasion of Ukraine Analysis
The continuing conflict in Ukraine further highlights the increased importance of obman in Russian military operations. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea demonstrated the continuity between maskirovka and obman in the form of concealment, simulations, demonstrations, and disinformation. The conflict further demonstrated how Russian employment of obman has changed since its previous employment in the Second World War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and intervention in Czechoslovakia. The invasion of Ukraine witnessed a shift in Russian deception. Plausible deniability of transpiring events supplanted physical concealment of forces.
A significant difference between previous deception efforts and efforts in Ukraine was Russia’s increased use of disinformation over other forms of deception. Disinformation formed the cornerstone of Russian obman efforts in Ukraine. It was significant that a majority of the disinformation that occurred in Ukraine was executed across the whole of government. Russian political leaders, state media, government controlled social media trolls, and government agents were used to spread false information and create a false narrative surrounding the unfolding events. The scale of these efforts overshadows the diplomatic and intelligence service efforts employed during the Battle of Kursk, Cuban Missile Crisis, and intervention in Czechoslovakia.
Beyond the whole of government use of disinformation, Russian Federation Armed Forces focused deception efforts on the use of simulations and demonstrations. The employment of “little green men,” Russian soldiers wearing masks and no unit or national identification, constituted tactical and operational simulation of local partisan forces. Operationally, demonstrations along the Ukrainian border by Russian military forces assisted in fixing Ukraine’s attention away from Crimea. Concealment occurred at the tactical level to infiltrate Russian soldiers into Ukraine. Beyond this, concealment assisted in force protection and survivability on the battlefield but did not play as large a role as it did during the Second World War or Cuban Missile Crisis.
